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Many important decisions are taken not by the person who will ultimately gain or lose
from the outcome, but on their behalf, by somebody else. We examined economic
decision-making about risk and time in situations in which deciders chose for others
who also chose for them. We propose that this unique setting, which has not been
studied before, elicits perception of reciprocity that prompts a unique bias in prefer-
ences. We found that decision-makers are less patient (more discounting), and more
risk averse for losses than gains, with other peoples’ money, especially when their
choices for others are more uncertain. Those results were derived by exploiting a
computational modeling framework that has been shown to account for the underlying
psychological and neural decision processes. We propose a novel theoretical mecha-
nism—precautionary preferences under social uncertainty, which explains the findings.
Implications for future research and alternative models are also discussed.
Keywords: decision-making, risk preferences, time preferences, self–other differences,
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You can spend your own money on yourself. When you
do that, why then you really watch out what you’re doing,
and you try to get the most for your money. . . . Finally,
I can spend somebody else’s money on somebody else.
And if I spend somebody else’s money on somebody
else, I’m not concerned about how much it is, and I’m
not concerned about what I get. And that’s govern-
ment. And that’s close to 40% of our national income.
—Milton Friedman, Fox News interview (May 2004)
Decisions on behalf of others are ubiquitous
across much human social and economic activ-
ity (Stiglitz, 1987), from doctors taking deci-
sions on behalf of patients to city traders decid-
ing on behalf of investors (Wonderling, Gruen,
& Black, 2005). For example, investors dele-
gate to traders the responsibility to manage their
money, which the former cannot continuously
monitor and control. This is the case for most
contracts written in a world of information
asymmetry, uncertainty, and risk. It is crucial,
therefore, to understand how people actually
make decisions on behalf of others and how this
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differs from when they make decisions on their
own behalf. Taking a doctor as an example,
subject to resource constraints, she might act to
maximize a patient’s health (Culyer, 1989; Wil-
liams, 1988), maximize the economic utility of
the patient by minimizing the financial cost
(Evans, 1984), or maximize social welfare by
minimizing the cost to society (Mooney, 1994).
A rich plethora of studies have reported how
people decide on behalf of others. Examples
include studies using nonmonetary decision
outcomes (Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, & All-
gaier, 2003; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012;
Kray, 2000; Kray & Gonzalez, 1999; Polman,
2012a; Stone, Choi, de Bruin, & Mandel, 2013;
Wray & Stone, 2005; Zikmund-Fisher, Sarr,
Fagerlin, & Ubel, 2006), hypothetical monetary
outcomes (Bartels & Rips, 2010; Borresen,
1987; Hsee & Weber, 1997; Takahashi, 2007;
Ziegler & Tunney, 2012), between-subjects de-
signs that do not directly compare the within-
person decisions made for oneself with the same
decisions made for somebody else (Fernandez-
Duque & Wifall, 2007; Pronin, Olivola, & Ken-
nedy, 2008), outcomes that are only in the do-
main of risky gains without the possibility for
losses (Stone, Yates, & Caruthers, 2002; Teger
& Kogan, 1975), and within-subject designs
that compare outcomes in the domain of both
risky gains and risky losses (Cvetkovich, 1972;
Polman, 2012a).
In a review of the literature of risk taking for
others, Polman (2012b) stressed that
much of the research on choosing-for-others deals with
risk preferences, with some research reporting that
decisions tend to be more risky when made on behalf
of others (Beisswanger et al., 2003; Stone et al., 2002;
Ubel, Angott, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2011; Wray &
Stone, 2005) and other research reporting that deci-
sions tend to be less risky when made on behalf of
others (McCauley, Kogan, & Teger, 1971; Teger &
Kogan, 1975; Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1964; Zaleska
& Kogan, 1971). (p. 142)
Given this doubt about whether choices for others
are more or less risky as compared with choices
for the self, Polman (2012b) answered a different
question: whether choices that people make for
others are less loss-averse. Andersson, Holm,
Tyran, and Wengström (2016) found that deciding
for others reduces loss aversion (less risk taking
for self than others when gains and losses are
possible). In intertemporal choices, the evidence is
also mixed, with some research reporting that de-
ciders are more patient (discount less) when de-
ciding for others (Pronin et al., 2008; Ziegler &
Tunney, 2012), and other research reporting that
decisions tend to be more impatient (discount
more) when deciding for others (Bartels & Rips,
2010; Takahashi, 2007). In summary, the mixed
evidence for surrogate decisions clearly suggests
that situational or contextual factors may be me-
diating those effects.
A characteristic feature of the design of all
previous studies is that decision-makers are asked
to make choices either for self, others, or both self
and others. In contrast to this work, we uniquely
study the kind of situations in which decision-
makers make decisions for others who also make
decisions for them. This is an important topic to
understand, as many in important relationships
make decisions for each other. In any team situa-
tion, individuals are making decisions for others
as well as on behalf of themselves. This also
includes people in close relationships, close
friends, and married couples (e.g., spouses make
decisions for each other frequently). Also, many
situations in which strangers are brought together
to form a team with others to perform a task
contains such reciprocal decision-making (e.g., in
the military, in business, and even some tasks in
the TV program The Apprentice). Individuals
working in large organizations may also make
such, often anonymous, decisions for each other.
Because in reality there are many confounding
factors that could explain preferences, such as
memory of previous interactions, our design strips
the decision task down to an anonymous interac-
tion that preserves only the “reciprocity” element
under a set of neutral baseline conditions: confi-
dentiality of the decisions and lack of opportunity
for retaliation. Thus, the “you choose for me and
I choose for you” paradigm, in which the “other”
subject is just chosen at random, should make
only “reciprocity” more salient, so we can study
its unique effect on preferences in such situations.
As it turns out, none of the previous studies in the
literature have employed this setting.
Uncertainty Moderates Decisions for
Others
Social interactions are plagued with uncer-
tainty because actors can never truly know what
it is like to see or experience something from
someone else’s point of view (Harsanyi, 1977;
Nagel, 1974). Instead, people must rely on their
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best estimates of others’ beliefs and preferences
to guide social decision-making (Yoshida,
Dolan, & Friston, 2008) and choose carefully
when outcomes affect the fate of others. There-
fore, a likely moderator of decisions for others
is uncertainty about others’ preferences and
goals. Conversely, if we are certain about what
others want, regardless of how different from
our own values, we are likely to implement
those preferences in our choices for them (see
Nicolle et al., 2012 for evidence that decisions
for others are attuned to others’ preferences, and
draw on brain mechanisms used when decisions
are made for the self, if the actors have the
opportunity to learn what the other person
would decide in a similar situation).
Computational Modeling of Decisions for
Others
Computational modeling of the underlying
decision processes is informative in this task
because it is not clear whether decisions for
others reveal preferences or some non-prefer-
ence-based decision strategies (see DellaVigna,
2009). Simply observing behavioral choices
does not tell us what the underlying mecha-
nisms of such decision-making may be. Specif-
ically, according to popular economic and be-
havioral theories (DellaVigna, 2009), there are
three stages through which decisions are made:
(a) start with underlying preference (desires,
“wants,” and “needs”); (b) then form beliefs
about likelihood/probability of different out-
comes; (c) and use a decision-making rule to
assess the available information and make a
choice that satisfies the preferences, given the
beliefs. Psychological factors can affect each
step. For example, preferences are affected by
the desire to avoid unpleasant emotions such as
regret (Loomes & Sugden, 1982). Moreover,
urges for immediate gratification create self-
control problems and challenge the assumption
that the discount factor is time-consistent (Laib-
son, 1997), and reference points challenge the
assumption that decision utility depends on total
lifetime wealth (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Beliefs are often formed following intuitions
incapable of assessing actual risk, which lead to
overconfidence about one’s abilities (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992). Different decision rules or
heuristics are adopted to simplify decisions un-
der the constraint that rationality is bounded
(Simon, 1997).
Computational neuroscience and economics
have offered a range of approaches to model
such phenomena during those three stages of the
decision-making process (Glimcher, Camerer,
Fehr, & Poldrack, 2009; Rangel, Camerer, &
Montague, 2008). The parameters of these mod-
els have even been found to correlate with neu-
ral activity in specific brain structures, which
suggest that those models might provide a
mechanistic level of explanation of overt deci-
sion behaviors (see Glimcher et al., 2009). We
employ such computational models to test the
specific hypotheses about how individuals make
financial decisions involving risk and time for
self and others. Such models are designed to
reveal whether specific “preferences” and “de-
cision rules” account for observed behavioral
choices.1
In terms of this decision model, the uncer-
tainty mechanism makes a prediction concern-
ing the “decision rule” that translates (time and
risk) preferences into choices. Uncertainty in
decision-making is reflected in choice noisiness,
or, more formally, the reliability with which
decision values are translated into choices (De
Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013). The
uncertainty principle makes two crucial predic-
tions. First, it implies more noisy choices for
others than for self in general. Second, if uncer-
tainty moderates decisions for others, then pref-
erences should be different between deciders
with more and less noisy choices for others
respectively. We tested those two predictions by
assessing the noise in participants’ choices by
fitting a stochastic decision rule with a noise
parameter and estimating the parameter for de-
cisions for self and others, respectively.
Experiment 1: Intertemporal Choice for
Self and Others
To examine preferences and decision rules
for self and others, we designed an intertempo-
ral choice task, which asked participants to
make choices between larger rewards delivered
later, and smaller rewards delivered sooner,
sometimes for themselves and other times on
1 Because payoff probabilities and delays will be explic-
itly presented in our decision tasks, we will model only
changes in “preferences” and “decision rules,” not “beliefs.”
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behalf of an anonymous other participant. It is
known that different individuals display signif-
icant variability in their preferences, with rela-
tively low discounters preferring to wait for a
later higher reward option and relatively high
discounters preferring the more immediate
smaller reward (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Pine
et al., 2009). This behavioral variability can be
quantified by estimating an individual’s dis-
count rate, a parameter which quantifies an in-
dividual’s disposition to discount the value of
delayed relative to more immediate rewards.
We were also interested in model parameters
that could distinguish individuals both in their
valuations and choice preferences. In previous
studies of value comparison, ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex activity has been found to corre-
late with the subjective value of a chosen option
or with the value difference between chosen and
unchosen options (Basten, Biele, Heekeren, &
Fiebach, 2010; Fitzgerald, Seymour, & Dolan,
2009) both when deciding for oneself and for
others (Nicolle et al., 2012).
Method
Participants. Forty-five participants (23
male and 22 female) were randomly allocated to
two groups of 22 and 23 subjects, respectively.
All subjects provided informed consent and the
study was covered by approval granted by Uni-
versity College London Research Ethics Com-
mittee. All subjects were students at London
universities (the vast majority were undergrad-
uates and from University College London).
Design. Subjects were invited to the labo-
ratory and seated in separate cubicles to ensure
privacy in decision-making. To reinforce the
social nature of the task, they were given writ-
ten instructions (see Appendix A), which em-
phasized that their payoff may be determined by
another subject’s choices, in which case the
other subject’s payoff would be determined by
their own choices. The study was conducted
using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
The study consisted of 240 trials in which, in
each trial, a subject chose between two amounts
to be received at different dates in the future for
a beneficiary. The main treatment variable was
a within-subject variation in the beneficiary of
the decisions, which could be either “me” (i.e.,
the subject themselves), “other (female)” (i.e.,
another subject in the lab that was female), and
“other (male).” In addition to being displayed
on the screen, the background of the screen was
color coded depending on the beneficiary: black
for self, light blue for another male, and pink for
another female.
In each trial, the subject was shown a screen
with the following information: the beneficiary of
the trial (i.e., if that trial is chosen, this determines
who receives the payoff), the trial number (from 1
to 240), and two payment options (which are
framed as “Option i: £x in y weeks”) together with
two buttons. Subjects could press only one button,
corresponding to their chosen option. To prevent
accidental double clicks and to encourage subjects
to think, the buttons did not appear until a second
after the options were displayed. The options al-
ways had a higher amount of money at a later date
(e.g., £17 in 20 weeks) in one option (the later
option) and a lower amount of money at a sooner
date (e.g., £14 in 1 week) in the other option (the
sooner option), but which option was labeled Op-
tion 1 (and presented on the left of the screen) and
which was labeled Option 2 (and presented on the
right) was chosen at random; this enabled us to
identify subjects that may have been consistent in
their behavior only because they clicked the same
button each time. A screenshot of a specific trial is
shown in Figure 1.
The sooner option payment date was always
either 0, 1, or 2 weeks (0 weeks being the day of
the experiment) and the later date varied be-
tween 1 and 25 weeks; the sooner payment
amount varied between zero and £24 and the
later payment amount varied between £6 and
£49. A number of attention checks were in-
cluded in the parameter choices, that is, options
in which the payment size was the same but the
dates were different, options in which the dates
were the same but the payment size was differ-
ent, and options in which the payment size was
zero.
There were 80 trials containing different pos-
sible combinations of magnitudes and delays
reflecting a wide range of implied discount fac-
tors (for more information how the options were
generated see Nicolle et al., 2012), and subjects
faced the entire set once for each beneficiary.
Trials were split up into blocks of 40 choices for
the same beneficiary (all participants performed
all three beneficiary conditions); the blocks
were ordered at random as were the different
trials within a block. There was a 30-s time
between blocks for rest.
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Although subjects could make decisions at
their own pace (there was no time limit—hence,
also no incentive to rush decisions), a session
could not be completed until all subjects had
completed their decision-making (as payoffs
may depend on other subject’s decisions). After
all subjects had completed all of their choices,
subjects were randomly assigned to be paid
based either on their own choice or the choice of
another subject, and one choice was randomly
selected for each subject to be paid.
In total, each session lasted about 65 min,
including reading instructions and dealing with
payment administration. To completely isolate
the effect of time discounting on decision-
making, there was no show up fee in this ex-
periment, and subjects earned on average £25.
64. The money was credited into the subjects’
bank account or via PayPal at the time specified
in the payoff-relevant choice (e.g., if the payoff-
relevant choice was to be paid £17 in 20 weeks,
they were paid £17 exactly 20 weeks after the
experiment).
Behavioral modeling. A function that de-
scribes the pattern of discounting can be esti-
mated by observing choices between delayed
outcomes. Economic theories of rational behav-
ior posit that goods ought to be discounted
exponentially with delay (Samuelson, 1937).
Formally, an outcome that has value or utility M
if received immediately (T  0) is worth T · M
if delayed T periods into the future. The present-
time utility U of receiving M at time T is thus
given by
U  T · M. (1)
Here, the discount rate, , represents the con-
stant proportional decrease in value with each
added time period of delay. Contrary to predic-
tions of exponential discounting, a large body of
evidence with both human and animal subjects
has demonstrated that discount rates appear to
decrease with increasing delays (Green & My-
erson, 2004; Rubinstein, 2003). Again, each
participant’s unique discount rate was estimated
by fitting a discount function to their choices,
whereby the discounted utility/value of an op-
tion (U) varies hyperbolically as a function of
reward or payoff magnitude (M) and delay (T):
U 
M
1T
. (2)
A proposed alternative is the “quasihyper-
bolic” approximation to hyperbolic discounting
(Laibson, 1997), which is formalized as expo-
Figure 1. An example trial screenshot for the delegated intertemporal choice task. See the
online article for the color version of this figure.
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nential discounting, with an additional prefer-
ence for immediate rewards (present bias), ex-
pressed as a second discount factor, , and
applied to all time periods except the first:
U  MT0(T · MT), (3)
where MT0 is the immediate payoff, MT is the
payoff in period T,  is an individual’s present
bias parameter, and  is the individual’s long-
run discount factor. When   1, individuals are
not present biased and the quasihyperbolic
model reduces to standard exponential dis-
counting. Such present-biased time preferences
may be the result of the interplay between two
separate decision-making systems: the affective
system that values immediate gratification and
the deliberative system that makes long-run
plans and displays higher discount factors (Mc-
Clure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004).
Given a subjective (i.e., temporally dis-
counted) value associated with each of the
two (sooner vs. later) options in the pair, the
associated probability of making each choice
is estimated with a softmax (logistic) decision
rule, in which   0 determines the random-
ness of the decision— higher numbers indi-
cate more deterministic, less random choice
(in our simulations,  was constrained be-
tween 0 and 10):
P(Later)  1
1 e (U(Later)U(Sooner))
. (4)
This is a standard stochastic decision rule that
calculates the probability of taking one of two
actions according to their relative subjective
values (see Glimcher et al., 2009). This model
also describes neural signals in medial prefron-
tal cortex, which compute the choice prefer-
ences of another individual as well as oneself—
both in terms of subjective valuations of options
and in terms of choices (see Nicolle et al.,
2012).
Critically, it is necessary to optimize the choice
pairs such that they give the most efficient esti-
mate of potential subjects’ discount rates. To op-
timize these choices, we generated a random 80
choice pairs, each comprising one smaller, sooner
reward and one larger, more delayed reward, but
with the magnitudes and delays varying across the
pairs. We then computed the decisions predicted
to be made by simulated subjects with discount
rates ranging from 0 to 1. When plotted those
simulated discount rates against the predicted
number of choices of the delayed option, the
closer this graph is to the diagonal, the better
different discount rates are reflected in different
subject choices, and, therefore, the lower the error
introduced by the model estimation process (Ni-
colle et al., 2012). We generated 10,000 such
choice sets and chose the set whose curve was
closest to the diagonal (in terms of enclosed area).
In this choice set, magnitudes ranged between £0
and £24 for sooner options, with their delays rang-
ing from 0 to 2 weeks. For the more delayed
options of each pair, the magnitudes ranged from
£6 to £49, and the delays from 1 to 25 weeks, as
these provided the lowest correlations in self and
other choices and values.
The three choice models (Equations 1–3)
were separately fit to participants’ choices in
the prescreen questionnaire, optimizing their
free parameters (, , and ) to maximize the
likelihood of the choices (Equation 4), given
the parameters. This was realized through
standard MATLAB functions used to com-
pute maximum likelihood estimation. Model
comparison was performed at the group level,
by summation of individual log likelihoods.
Selection between models proceeded using
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC;
Schwarz, 1978), in which L is the maximized
group-level log likelihood, k is the number of
free parameters in the model, and n is the
number of independent observations:
BIC – 2L 2k lnn. (5)
For BIC, Kass and Raftery (1995) propose the
following taxonomy of what constitutes a substan-
tial difference in criterion values: 0–2  weak,
2–6  positive, 6–10  strong, and 10  very
strong. We used BIC to compare between three
versions of the model.
Finally, after selecting the winning model,
we included in the analysis only the partici-
pants for whom the model performed above
certain minimum goodness-of-fit measure.
We applied McFadden’s (1979) pseudo-R2 to
measure the improvement from null model to
fitted model:
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R2  1
ln L^(MFull)
ln L^(M0)
, (6)
where MFull is the model with predictors, M0 is the
model without predictors that assumes random
choice, and L^ is the estimated likelihood. The
likelihood for the null model is defined as follows:
L^(M0)  k
1
N
, (7)
where N is the number of choice options (each
choice is equally likely, so with two options 1/N
0.5) and k is the number of observations or
choices. Note that the theoretical range is 0 
McFadden pseudo-R2  1, but as a rule of thumb,
the model has an excellent fit when 0.20  Mc-
Fadden pseudo-R2  0.40 (McFadden, 1979).2
Results
The computational modeling reveals important
variance in the data, because it allows us to sep-
arate the effects preferences and choice uncer-
tainty. The impact of delay depends on the partic-
ipant’s preferences measured by their unique
discount rate (), which was constrained to fall
between 0 and 1. In our task, this was a reasonable
constraint, as a subject with a discount rate of 1
would always choose the smaller sooner option on
trials in which the delay and magnitude favored
opposite choices. The hyperbolic discount model
produced the best model fit (BIC  6,273) com-
pared with the exponential model (BIC  6,283)
and the quasihyperbolic model (BIC  6,854).
(Note that smaller numbers reflect a better fit.)
With our winning hyperbolic model, replacing the
separate parameters for Other decisions for males
and females (male and female; male and female)
with the single gender-independent free parameter
(other and other) resulted in even better BIC per-
formance: 5,956 versus 6,273, respectively. Here,
we present the statistical analysis of the parame-
ters of this best-fitting self-other hyperbolic model
(although similarly significant results are obtained
when analyzing the parameters of the model with
separate male and female parameters).
We excluded from the analysis four participants
(two male and two female) for whom the model
showed unsatisfactory McFadden pseudo-R2
goodness-of-fit measure (mean R2  .12), thus
analyzing the data from the 41 remaining partici-
pants (mean R2  .72). Table 1 presents the mod-
eling results and the behavioral choices in each
condition according to the beneficiary (self and
other). The discounting parameters () from this
winning model and the simpler metric (proportion
delayed choices) were highly correlated for self
(r0.81) and other (r0.83). We analyzed
the distribution of the inferred individual time
discounting parameters for self and other. The
differences between the self and other conditions
were examined with nonparametric statistical
analysis because this variable was not normally
distributed according to the Kolmogorov–Smir-
nov test of normality for self (D 0.33, p .001)
and other (D  0.31, p  .001). The Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test revealed that the discounting pa-
rameter () was significantly higher in other ben-
eficiary condition compared with self, Z  2.78,
p  .006. The behavioral data from those partic-
ipants revealed the same pattern. The proportion
of delayed choices was significantly higher in the
self beneficiary condition as compared with other,
Z 3.31, p .001, t(40) 3.02, p .004, using
paired-samples t test.3 The individual level analy-
2 Note that this procedure also controls for the effect of
confounding factors such as choice fatigue or depletion due
to the number of choices in each session. This is because
such factors can only lead to randomness and inconsistency
in choice, which should lead to worse fit of the model, and
we have addressed this issue by excluding from the mod-
eling part such participants.
3 We also analyzed the effect of gender on choices but did
not find significant results. The differences between the
conditions were examined with a mixed-model two-way
(Beneficiary 	 Gender) univariate analysis of variance
(general linear model), with beneficiary as within-subject
variable, participant gender as between-subjects variable,
and the mean proportion of choices of the later (delayed)
option as the dependent measure. There was a significant
main effect of beneficiary, F(2, 86)  6.93, p  .002 (
2 
.14). Post hoc analysis revealed that after Bonferroni adjust-
ment for multiple comparisons, the proportion of later picks
for self was significantly higher than the proportions for
both male (p  .010) and female (p  .043) others, and
male was not significantly different from female others (p
1.000). There was no significant main effect of the partici-
pant’s own gender, F(1, 43)  0.54, p  .467 (
2  .01),
suggesting that male and female participants did not exhibit
different levels of impatience (i.e., delay discounting). The
Beneficiary 	 Gender interaction was also not significant,
F(2, 86)  0.30, p  .739 (
2  .01), which means that
male and female participants did not respond differently
when choosing for a same- or opposite-sex beneficiary (i.e.,
the degree of time discounting, indicated by the proportions
of later choices, did not vary depending on the gender of the
decision maker and the beneficiary, respectively).
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sis revealed that for 27 of the participants the time
preference estimate  was smaller when making
decisions for oneself than for the other (M 0.06,
SD 0.18), whereas 14 participants exhibited the
opposite pattern—the time preference estimate
was larger when making decisions for oneself
(M  0.01, SD  0.03). Note, however, that the
magnitude of the difference is negligible when
discounting for self is larger (i.e., those individuals
could be considered as having equal discounting
for self and other).
We also analyzed how the choice randomness
parameter () varied across the two conditions,
which tested the key prediction that the uncer-
tainty in decision-making is reflected in choice
noisiness, or more formally the fidelity with
which decision values are translated into
choices (De Martino et al., 2013). Recall that
the uncertainty principle predicts more noisy
choices for others than for self. Also, if uncer-
tainty moderates decisions for others, then those
preferences should be different between decid-
ers with more or less noisy choices for others
respectively. We used nonparametric statistical
analysis, because this variable was not normally
distributed according to the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test of normality for self (D  0.34,
p  .001) and other (D  0.44, p  .001). The
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test revealed that the
average  across participants was significantly
higher when deciding for self beneficiary com-
pared with other, Z  3.52, p  .001 (i.e.,
decisions were less deterministic, or more ran-
dom, for others). The next step in the analysis
was to determine whether the difference be-
tween  for other moderates the self–other dif-
ferences in discounting. We did a median split
of the s for other, which divided the sample
into high and low uncertainty group depending
on whether they were below or above the me-
dian , respectively. The between-subjects tests
revealed that discounting was significantly dif-
ferent between those groups—more discounting
for lower , that is, when the participants were
more uncertain/random about the preferences of
other. Specifically, the Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test revealed that the discounting parameter ()
was significantly higher for other beneficiary in
the high (M  0.12, SE  .05; Mdn  0.06) as
compared with the low (M  0.09, SE  .05;
Mdn  0.02) uncertainty group respectively,
Z  2.44, p  .015. The self–other differences
in discounting was also higher in the high (M 
0.07, SE  .05; Mdn  0.02) as compared with
the low (M  0.01, SE  .01; Mdn  0.00)
uncertainty group, Z  2.53, p  .012. The
behavioral data from those participants revealed
the same pattern. The proportion of delayed
choices for other was significantly smaller in the
high (M  0.68, SE  .04; Mdn  0.69) com-
pared with the low (M  0.82, SE  .05;
Mdn  0.90) uncertainty group, Z  2.78, p 
.005. Similarly, the self–other difference in pro-
portions of delayed choices was higher in the
high (M  0.09, SE  .03; Mdn  0.07) as
compared with the low (M  0.01, SE  .01;
Mdn  0.00) uncertainty group, Z  2.77, p 
.006. Note that the differences between the high
and low uncertainty groups were examined with
nonparametric statistical analysis because all
variables were not normally distributed accord-
ing to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normal-
ity for other  (D  0.31, p  .001), self–other
 (D  0.34, p  .001), other proportions (D 
0.15, p  .019), and self–other proportions
(D  0.20, p  .001).
Discussion
The behavioral results and the modeling pa-
rameters for time discounting showed that indi-
viduals are more impulsive (less patient) with
other peoples’ money. Our modeling results
also revealed that choices are more random
when making time–money trade-offs for others,
which indicates uncertainty about their prefer-
ences. We also observed more impatient deci-
sions for others in decision-makers with nois-
ier choices for the others, which supports the
prediction that uncertainty about others’ pref-
erences moderates decision-making. Thus, the
study revealed unique biases in both the pref-
erences and in the decision rules that individ-
Table 1
Intertemporal Choice According to Beneficiary
(Self and Other)
Measure
Beneficiary
N
Self Other
M SE M SE
Time discounting () 0.07 .02 0.11 .03 41
Choice randomness () 2.43 .54 1.68 .49 41
Proportion later choices 0.80 .03 0.75 .03 41
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uals employ when making a choice that sat-
isfies their time preferences (in line with the
decision framework proposed at the begin-
ning, DellaVigna, 2009).
Experiment 2: Risky Choice for Self and
Others
We also investigated whether decision-
making under risk is different when people use
their own money rather than somebody else’s
money. We did not test for differences in be-
havior for male and female beneficiaries in this
study for two reasons. First, because this hy-
pothesis has already been established in risky
choice for self and others (Cvetkovich, 1972;
Stone & Allgaier, 2008; Stone et al., 2002), and
second, because removing the gender factor
from our design provided enhanced power for
assessing the effect of decision (gain/loss) va-
lence.
Method
Participants. Fifty individuals participated
in the study; the study was conducted in three
groups of 18, 18, and 16 subjects (33 females
and 17 males). All subjects had previously pro-
vided informed consent, and the study was cov-
ered by approval granted to the Department of
Economics from the University College London
Research Ethics Committee. All subjects were
students at London universities (the vast major-
ity were undergraduates and from University
College London).
Design. Subjects were invited to the labo-
ratory and seated in separate cubicles to ensure
privacy in decision-making. To reinforce the
social nature of the task, they were again given
written instructions (see Appendix B), which
emphasized that their payoff would be partly
determined by another subject’s choices, and
that their “partner’s” payoff would depend
partly on their payoffs. The study was con-
ducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher,
2007).
Screenshots of two trials are shown in Figure
2—the task was adapted from Wright et al.
(2012). In each trial, participants needed to
choose between a “gamble” option and a “sure”
option. First, the participants saw a blank screen
with fixation cross; second, they were shown
the pie chart with four sectors for the gamble
option and the value of the sure option. After
the pie chart had been displayed for 4 s, two
buttons appeared, one of which they pressed to
register their choice.
If the “gamble” option is selected, subjects
win one of the four specified amounts with a
probability given by the corresponding area of
the pie chart. If the “sure” option is chosen,
subjects win the specified “sure amount” for
certain. The colors (chosen from a set of neutral
colors) and the order and orientation of the pie
sectors are determined at random. Wright et al.
(2012) showed that the degree of risk in those
lotteries positively correlated with neural activ-
ity in posterior parietal cortex, a region strongly
associated with risk, and the manipulation of
“valence” was expressed in greater activity for
gains than losses in value-related areas of or-
bitofrontal cortex and bilateral striatum.
Figure 2. Structure of the risky decision task on two separate trials. (a) An example of a gain
trial choice for self. (b) An example of a loss trial choice for other. See the online article for
the color version of this figure.
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The study investigated two main factors. The
first factor was the effect of beneficiary,
whereby subjects played half the trials on behalf
of themselves and half on behalf of another
subject in the laboratory. The beneficiary was
displayed on the screen in each individual trial.
The second factor was the effect of winning
versus losing money in a trial—the so-called
valence effect. Half the trials were in the gain
domain, in which the gamble amounts and sure
amount were positive, and the other half were in
the loss domain, in which they were negative.
This provided a 2 	 2 factorial design in this
basic design with within-subject factors for Va-
lence (gain or loss) and Beneficiary (self or
other). For each subject, the first half of the
session was played for one beneficiary and the
second half for the other beneficiary; within
each half, gain and loss trials were played in a
random order. The color of the background
screen was specific to the beneficiary type.
There were 49 distinct gamble options, and
they were played four times each by each sub-
ject (once for each combination or gain/loss and
self/other) for a total of 196 decisions per sub-
ject. The sure option was always a gain or loss
of £3 and the gamble options ranged from £0 to
£6. Thus, across the set of 49 gain trials, we
parametrically manipulated the degree of risk in
the lottery (using seven levels of variance) and
orthogonally manipulated its expected value
(EV; seven levels). One-half of the lotteries had
an EV above the sure amount and one half
below (mean EV across all 49 lotteries was
equal to the sure option), which provided a
simple metric of risk preference indexed as the
proportion of riskier choices made (proportion
risky choices: risk neutral, 0.5; risk averse, 0.5;
risk seeking, 0.5). To manipulate valence, we
created 49 perfectly matched loss trials by multi-
plying all amounts in our gain trials by 1 (see
also Wright et al., 2012, for more information on
how these trials were constructed). The full set of
trial parameters was seen once in each cell of the
design in every session, so the full set was shown
four times in total—gain and loss for self and
other each.
Participants’ payments comprised a £5 show
up fee, plus a £12 initial endowment (allowing
for any losses occurred in the loss frame trials),
plus the outcome of four randomly chosen tri-
als—two in which the subject chose on behalf
of themselves (one gain and one loss frame) and
two in which another subject chose on their
behalf (one gain and one loss frame). The £12
covered the worst possible outcome (in which
participants won £0 in the gain frame and lost
£6 in the loss frame). Sessions lasted about an
hour including reading instructions and process-
ing payments and subjects earned an average of
£17.
Behavioral modeling. In our analysis, we
assessed whether the participants become nois-
ier in their choices for the other person by fitting
a choice model to choices in each of the four
cells of the factorial design (gain/loss, self/
other) in which the utility of the sure and gam-
ble options are computed in each trial (using a
mean-variance utility function), with the soft-
max (logistic) decision rule used to choose be-
tween them. Therefore, we estimated a risk pa-
rameter and noise parameter in each condition
for each subject. We modeled individual
choices using a binary logistic regression utility
model. On each trial the subjective values, or
utilities (U), of both options (gamble vs. sure)
were computed using a utility function; then,
these values were compared with generated tri-
al-by-trial probability of accepting the lottery,
using a softmax function with a free parameter
 (constrained between 0 and 10), which allows
for noise in action selection as follows:
P(Gamble)  1
1 e (U(Gamble)U(Sure))
. (8)
Note that this randomness/noisiness parameter
 is also shown to correlate with prefrontal
neural structures (anterior frontopolar cortex)
that control for exploration versus exploitation
strategies in decision-making under uncertainty
(Daw, O’Doherty, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan,
2006). Also, in line with prefrontal cortex’ role
as the principal region implicated in behavioral
control, Daw et al. showed that activity in the
orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal corti-
ces correlates with the probability assigned by
the model to the action chosen on a given trial.
(In the softmax model, this probability is a
relative measure of the expected reward value
of the chosen action.)
We then define the subjective value, or utility
(U), of each lottery using the mean-variance
model:
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UGambleEVVar. (9)
EV is the expected (mean) value, Var is the
variance of the gamble option. For a given
lottery with N potential outcomes (m1, m2, . . .
mN), with probabilities p  p1, p2, . . . pn, we
define those statistical moments as follows:
EV  
n1
N
mnpn, (10)
Var  
n1
N
(mnEV)2pn, (11)
where  is a risk parameter (constrained be-
tween 1 and 1, reflecting the taste for risk,
with zero indicating risk neutrality, a positive
number risk seeking, and a negative number risk
aversion), and  reflects choice noisiness. Equa-
tion 10 also represents the most basic mean model,
and Equation 9 is known as the classic mean–
variance model (Bossaerts, 2010; Markowitz,
1952). In the mean–variance–valence model, on
each trial the subjective values, or utilities (U), of
both options (A and B) were computed using the
aforementioned utility function, where   gain
in gain trials and   loss in loss trials. Wright et
al. (2012) show that this mean–variance–valence
model best predicts behavioral data in this task
compared with the basic expected value model
(without variance term), the classic mean–vari-
ance model, the expected utility model (Camerer,
2003), the prospect theory model (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979), and the cumulative prospect the-
ory model (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). This
winning model enables extending ideas derived
from financial economics that individuals respond
to risk as measured by the variance in potential
outcomes (Bossaerts, 2010; Markowitz, 1952), by
incorporating valence. Also, Wright et al. (2012)
demonstrated that the components of this model
correlate with activity in brain regions in the pa-
rietal and temporal cortices, anterior insula, and
the ventral striatum, which are known to encode
risk information and decision utility.
In this model, there is no constant term, as we
assume a utility of 0 represents a point of subjec-
tive indifference between sure or gamble (i.e.,
rejection of offer has a utility of 0). We optimized
subject-specific  and  parameters using nonlin-
ear optimization implemented in MATLAB for
maximum likelihood estimation. In our simula-
tions of the observed decisions for self and other,
we extended the mean–variance model by replac-
ing the parameters  and  with separate param-
eters for self-trials (self and self) and other-trials
(other and other). Model fitting resulted in a set of
maximum likelihood parameter estimates for each
subject. Model comparison was performed at the
group level (fixed effects), by summation of log
likelihoods across participants. As in the previous
study, selection between models proceeded using
the BIC (Schwarz, 1978).
We used BIC to compare the following three
models, which allowed us to ask whether decision
behavior for self and other was influenced by risk
and valence (i.e., every model was fit to all the
data for each subject). First, a simple mean model
(see Equation 10) assumed that individuals only
cared about the mean value of the options. Sec-
ond, we asked whether choice was also influenced
by risk, using a mean–variance model [see Equa-
tion 9). Third, we asked whether both risk and
valence influence choice, using a mean–variance–
valence model with separate risk parameter that
reflects risk preference in gain trials and loss trials,
respectively.4 Again, after selecting the winning
model, we included in the analysis only the par-
ticipants for whom the model performed above
the minimum McFadden’s pseudo-R2 goodness-
of-fit measure.
Results
The behavioral modeling revealed that the
mean–variance–valence model produced the
best model fit (BIC 11,013) as compared with
the mean–variance model (BIC  11,225) and
the mean model (BIC  12,137).5 With our
4 We did not fit any version of prospect theory because
the mean-variance model has been consistently shown to
outperform prospect theory in this task (Wright et al., 2012;
Wright, Symmonds, Morris, & Dolan, 2013).
5 Similarly to Wright et al. (2012), we also explored
interindividual differences to seek further evidence of be-
havioral independence between the influences of risk and
valence. If these influences result from stable and indepen-
dent processes, we can predict that knowing an individual’s
sensitivity to one influence would not predict sensitivity to
the other. We conducted additional analysis, in which for
each participant, the average proportion of riskier choices
indexes risk preference and the difference in riskier choices
between gain and loss domains indexes the impact of va-
lence. Crucially, these preferences were independent, with
risk and valence effects showing no correlation across sub-
jects for either self (r  .03; p  .928) or other (r 
0.159; p  .270).
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winning model, replacing the single free param-
eter in our softmax decision rule () with sep-
arate parameters for gain trials (gain) and loss
trials (loss) resulted in worse BIC performance:
11,013 versus 11,388, respectively.
We included in the analysis the 40 partici-
pants for whom the model showed satisfactory
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 goodness-of-fit measure
(mean R2  .35), whereas for the excluded 10
participants this measure indicated that their
behavior was random and inconsistent (mean
R2  .15; McFadden, 1979). Risk-related pa-
rameters () from this winning model and the
simpler metric (proportion risky choices) were
highly correlated for gain and loss trials in both
conditions (self-gain, r .80; self-loss, r .95;
other-gain, r  78; other-loss, r  .82).
Table 2 presents the behavioral and modeling
results in each condition. Analyzing the data
from those participants alone, differences be-
tween conditions were examined with a repeat-
ed-measures two-way (Beneficiary 	 Valence)
univariate analysis of variance (general linear
model), with the mean risk aversion parameter
() as the dependent measure. There was no
significant main effect of Beneficiary, F(1,
39)  0.09, p  .765 (
2  .00), indicating that
those participants were not more risk averse
when deciding for self (vs. other). There was
still a significant main effect of Valence, F(1,
39)  9.99, p  .003 (
2  .20), which means
that the inferred risk aversion parameter was
significantly lower (more risk averse) for losses.
The Beneficiary 	 Valence interaction was sig-
nificant, F(1, 39)  5.34, p  .026 (
2  .12),
which confirms our hypothesis that the gain–
loss asymmetry in choices is bigger when de-
ciding for others.
The behavioral data from those participants
showed the same pattern. For each individual,
the behavioral proportion of risky choices in-
dexes risk preference, which was derived sepa-
rately for each cell in the (Beneficiary 	 Do-
main) design: self-gain, self-loss, other-gain,
other-loss. The differences between the condi-
tions were examined with a repeated-measures
two-way (Beneficiary 	 Domain) univariate
analysis of variance (general linear model using
probit link function), with the mean proportion
of risky choices as the dependent measure.
There was no significant main effect of Benefi-
ciary, F(1, 39)  2.60, p  .115 (
2  .06),
indicating that those participants were not more
risk averse when deciding for self (vs. other).
There was significant main effect of Valence,
F(1, 39)  6.19, p  .017 (
2  .14), which
means that the inferred risk aversion parameter
was significantly lower (more risk averse) for
losses. The Beneficiary 	 Valence interaction
was significant, F(1, 39)  3.68, p  .063
(
2  .09), which confirms that the gain–loss
asymmetry in choices is different between ben-
eficiaries.
Finally, we analyzed how the choice random-
ness parameter () varied across the two con-
ditions, because uncertainty in decision-making
is reflected in choice noisiness—the fidelity
with which decision values are translated into
choices (De Martino et al., 2013). The choice
randomness parameter () was significantly
higher in the self beneficiary condition as com-
pared with other, t(39)  3.07, p  .004 (using
Table 2
Risky Choice According to Beneficiary (Self vs. Other) and Payoff Valence
(Gain vs. Loss)
Measure Beneficiary Valence
Statistic
NM SE
Proportion risky
choices
Self Gain 0.44 .028 40
Loss 0.40 .027 40
Other Gain 0.49 .030 40
Loss 0.40 .032 40
Risk aversion
parameter ()
Self Gain 0.04 .033 40
Loss 0.07 .017 40
Other Gain 0.00 .045 40
Loss 0.13 .049 40
Choice randomness
parameter ()
Self Gain and loss 3.45 .208 40
Other Gain and loss 2.61 .284 40
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paired-samples t test). This indicates that the
choices for other were more uncertain (less de-
terministic) than for self. If uncertainty when
choosing for others moderates risky decision-
making, then the valence effect might be differ-
ent between deciders with more noisy choices
for others compared with deciders with less
noisy choices for others. Testing this prediction
involves determining whether the degree of ran-
domness (uncertainty) for other explains the
magnitude of the valence effect when deciding
for others. Our analysis supported this predic-
tion. Again, we did a median split of the s for
other, which divided the sample into high and
low uncertainty groups depending on whether
they were below or above the median , respec-
tively. The between-subjects tests revealed that
the valence effect was significantly different
between those groups—the difference between
risk aversion for gains compared with losses
was bigger when  was low, that is, when the
participants were more uncertain about the pref-
erences of other. Specifically, the Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test revealed that the difference
between the risk aversion parameter () for gain
and loss for other was significantly bigger in the
high uncertainty group (M  0.19, SE  .06;
Mdn  0.16) as compared with the low uncer-
tainty group (M  0.06, SE  .03; Mdn 
0.05), Z  2.30, p  .021. The differences were
examined with nonparametric statistical analy-
sis, because this variable was not normally dis-
tributed according to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test of normality (D  0.17, p  .006). The
behavioral data from those participants revealed
the same pattern. The difference between the
proportion of risky choices in the gain and loss
domain for other was significantly bigger in the
high uncertainty group (M  0.14, SE  .04;
Mdn  0.13) as compared with low uncertainty
group (M  0.03, SE  .03; Mdn  0.05),
t(38)  2.05, p  .047. The difference was
examined with standard parametric statistical t
test, because this variable was normally distrib-
uted (D  0.07, p  .200).
Discussion
The novel findings from this experiment con-
cern differences in risk preferences and decision
rules that individuals employ when making
choices for others compared with choices for
self in reciprocal situations. We found bigger
gain–loss asymmetry in risk preferences when
deciding for others as compared with oneself
(i.e., more risk-averse choices in the domain of
losses, relative to gains, when choosing on be-
half of others). This counterintuitive result was
revealed only thanks to the use of mechanistic
modeling that accounts for the underlying
choice processes. We also found that choices
are more random when deciding for others, ir-
respective of the underlying risk attitude, which
supports the prediction about the role of uncer-
tainty in decision-making for others. This was
also revealed by the computational model em-
ployed in the analysis. We also observed larger
valence effect for others in decision-makers
with noisier choices for others, which supports
the prediction that uncertainty about others’
preferences moderates risky decisions. This
specific result could also have important impli-
cations for understanding how such decisions
are made in the real world.
Our results replicate the greater gambling
for gains than losses, which was repeatedly
shown previously in this task (Wolf, Wright,
Kilford, Dolan, & Blakemore, 2013; Wright
et al., 2012; Wright, Morris, Guitart-Masip, &
Dolan, 2013; Wright, Symmonds, Morris, &
Dolan, 2013). Wright et al. explained these
findings within a biologically grounded, pro-
cess-based account of choice that progresses
from option evaluation to action selection. At
a mechanistic level, in the brain, it has been
argued that there are a number of interacting
valuation systems that together determine
choice, including a separate the Pavlovian
system for automatic approach–avoidance re-
sponses and a goal-directed system for reflec-
tive planning (Rangel et al., 2008). This
model predicts that in the choice process, risk
and valence (gain/loss) independently engage
automatic approach–avoidance mechanisms.
In simple instrumental tasks approach–
avoidance mechanisms underlie important va-
lence effects, evident in a close coupling be-
tween punishment and no-go (avoid)
responses, and between reward and go (ap-
proach) responses (Dickinson & Balleine,
2002; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). Wright et
al. (2013) showed valence perturbs an indi-
vidual’s choices independently of the impact
of risk, and causally implicate approach–
avoidance processes as important in shaping
risky choice (individuals exhibit base level of
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risk taking consistent across time and context,
but valence perturbs choices around that base
level). Depending on context, this mechanism
can produce either risk aversion for gains and
risk seeking for losses or vice versa. Wright et
al. showed that individuals chose a riskier
option less often with losses when the instru-
mental requirement was to approach (select)
as opposed to avoid (accept/reject) it. The
observation that stimuli signaling loss induce
avoidance is consistent with our design, in
which the number of potential losses in the
gamble (that does not contain £0 loss out-
come) is more salient than the single loss
option, thus triggering avoidance of the gam-
ble. This leads to more risk aversion for loss-
gambles than for gain-gambles (in which the
number of potential gains triggers approach
tendencies instead). In summary, those stud-
ies (including ours) illustrate the variety of
intricate ways in which context determines
how humans respond to aversive stimuli.
General Discussion
The behavioral results and the computational
modeling reveal that individuals are less patient
and more risk averse for losses than for gains with
other peoples’ money. These unique findings are
contingent on the kind of situations we are study-
ing—ones in which decision-makers make deci-
sions for others who also make decisions for them.
This setting, unique among previous research on
self–other decision-making, is likely to elicit per-
ception of reciprocity. Next, we offer possible
explanations of the observed behaviors.
Reciprocity Triggers Precautionary
Decisions
The perceived reciprocity in such situations
might affect decision-making in a specific way.
In particular, reciprocity could motivate people
to minimize others’ costs, relative to their own
cost. In policy making, the precautionary prin-
ciple prohibits actions that carry a risk of caus-
ing harm and imposes that decision-makers
should prove that actions are harmless (Sun-
stein, 2005). This moral principle, or attitude, is
consistent with observations that people dislike
causing bad outcomes, especially outcomes that
affect others (Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, &
Mendes, 2012; Ritov & Baron, 1990; Tetlock &
Boettger, 1994), which also reflects a wide-
spread social norm that prohibits harming oth-
ers and results in punishment when violated
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al.,
2010). In decision-theoretic (cost-benefit)
terms, every “harm” (such as pain, monetary
loss, and time delay) is conceptualized as a
specific type of “cost,” which should elicit pre-
cautionary decision making for others. For spe-
cific harms, such as pain, such “moral senti-
ment” (see Smith, 1759) even leads to a
disposition to overvalue others’ suffering, rela-
tive to one’s own, which is elegantly demon-
strated by Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel,
Dayan, and Dolan (2014), who found that ma-
jority of people selflessly sacrificed more
money to prevent a stranger’s pain than their
own pain (i.e., when participants were respon-
sible for others’ pain, most of them evaluated
the cost of that pain as higher than their own). In
this respect, Crockett et al. proposed that in
decisions about losses, if decision-makers as-
sume that the recipient’s mapping from a given
level of cost to subjective unpleasantness is
nonlinear, then this uncertainty could induce a
form of risk premium in the moral costs of
imposing what might be intolerable cost on
another. At this stage, decision-makers prefer to
avoid these moral costs by adopting a conser-
vative decision strategy leading them to system-
atically err on the side of reducing others’ pain.
There are solid arguments why a reciprocity
context would heighten precautionary prefer-
ences. One idea proposed by Crockett et al. (2014)
is that such preferences likely evolved in a reci-
procity context, that is, in real life most behavior is
public and harming others will trigger punish-
ment. So to avoid this potential punishment peo-
ple err on the side of caution. Social norms that
prohibit harm to others are widespread, and vio-
lation of these norms is often punished (see Buck-
holtz & Marois, 2012; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004;
Henrich et al., 2010). Therefore, an overall pref-
erence to avoid others’ suffering, relative to one’s
own suffering, has selective value, especially
when reciprocity is salient. In such situations,
those who are more cautious when deciding about
others’ pain would thus be less likely to suffer the
costs of such punishments. Such preferences
could either be innate or learned through social
experience. In our study, the experimental design
makes a concern for reciprocity salient, as partic-
ipants decide for each other, so this could make
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precautionary strategy more likely. In the context
of decisions for others involving risk and time, the
hypothesis that reciprocity triggers precautionary
preferences, which may be moderated by social
uncertainty, makes specific predictions.
In time discounting for others, there are two
predictions stemming from our proposed model.
First prediction is that deciders will be more
impatient by choosing sooner-smaller payoffs
when deciding for others, relative for self,
which is exactly what we observed. This is
because the proposed (reciprocity ¡ precau-
tionary preference) mechanism should motivate
deciders to minimize the potential harm to oth-
ers, which is the delay until receiving the re-
ward. Note that according to the standard cost–
benefit framework in economics (Kreps, 1990),
intertemporal choice involves a trade-off be-
tween money (benefit) and time/delay (cost),
which is why longer delays demand bigger pay-
offs. Psychologically, it is also likely that in
discounting with rewards, in which both out-
comes are framed as “gains,” the delay is the
most salient cost. Nevertheless, an alternative
assumption may be that if decision-makers want
to minimize the harm in their decisions for
others, then they may choose waiting, because a
more salient cost than the cost related to waiting
is the cost related to receiving less money (i.e.,
people might believe that losing money is more
harmful than losing time). In support of the
delay-as-cost assumption, we conducted a sta-
tistical analysis showing that the observed be-
havioral effect is moderated by participants’
individual discount rates. Specifically, the more
impatient deciders should be more likely to treat
time as a worse cost. The prediction is that high
discounters focus on the cost of delay, and,
therefore, have a bigger difference between self
and other discounting, in the direction of dis-
counting more for others. We did a median split
of the participants into high and low discounters
group respectively, and the average difference
between the discounting parameters for self and
other was significantly bigger in the high dis-
counting group (M  0.118) than the low dis-
counters group (M  0.004), Z  2.46, p 
.014. Note also that increased impatience in
choices for others cannot not driven by in-
creased concavity in the utility function for
money for others; because even though the pref-
erence elicitation procedure does not correct for
curvature in the utility function, this explanation
implies the decision-makers should also be
more risk averse for gains when deciding for
others—in fact, we observed the opposite pat-
tern in the risk-taking task.
Second prediction is that the more uncertain
decision-makers are about others, the more pre-
caution they will exercise by choosing sooner
(smaller) payoffs. Note that social uncertainty
stems from individuals not knowing as much
about other people’s time preferences and future
plans as they do about their own preferences
and plans (especially when the recipients are
anonymous strangers). This might make deci-
sion-makers concerned about choosing delayed
rewards for other people because, for example,
they do not know if the other person might hate
waiting, might have immediate needs, might be
leaving the country and closing their bank ac-
count, or might otherwise not be able to receive
the delayed reward. In line with this intuition,
Bartels and Rips (2010) demonstrated that de-
cisions for others tend to be more impatient
when a recipient is expected to undergo a sig-
nificant change in circumstances or a life-
changing event. In formal terms, uncertainty
about others would amount to less precise esti-
mate of another person’s future states compared
with one’s own future states. Therefore, if our
participants are uncertain about others’ states,
they may also judge providing the other person
with sooner rewards to be the favorable, “safer”
option. Our analysis supported this prediction—
more discounting for others when uncertainty
parameter is higher for others.
In risky choice for others, the proposed mech-
anism also makes two key predictions. The first
prediction is that we should observe bigger gain–
loss asymmetry in risk preferences when deciding
for others compared with oneself, that is, more
risk-averse choices in the domain of losses, rela-
tive to gains, when choosing on behalf of others.
This is because precautionary preference com-
mands more risk aversion with others’ money
when choosing between losing a fixed amount
(e.g., £-3) for sure versus a gamble offering sev-
eral negative outcomes (e.g., £-1, £-1.25, £-5.75,
£-6). In such cases, choosing the fixed £-3 loss
avoids the worst potential harm (£-6), which is the
most salient cost. This prediction is in line with
Paul Slovic’s (1987) research in risk perception,
which has identified a number of factors that con-
tribute to perception of risk, including the poten-
tial for large or catastrophic losses and affective
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reactions such as sense of “dread.” More recent
research has also demonstrated that the top-
ranking risk factors are related to the possibility
for large loss of the invested money and the feel-
ing of loss of control over the course of the in-
vestment (Vlaev, Chater, & Stewart, 2009). In
contrast, when all choice outcomes are gains,
there is no potential harm in selecting the gamble,
which implies that, given the uncertainty about
others’ preferences, decisions for others should be
close to risk neutrality, whereas decisions for self
will be risk averse as observed before (Rieger,
Wang, & Hens, 2015; Vlaev, Stewart, & Chater,
2008). In summary, the proposed processes imply
the deciders will be more risk averse for losses and
more risk seeking for gains when deciding for
others relative to self, which will result, as we
observed, in bigger gain–loss asymmetry in risk
preferences when deciding for others.6
The second prediction is that social uncertainty
about others’ preferences will moderate precau-
tionary decision-making under risk. Specifically,
precautionary harm aversion predicts avoiding the
worst harm in the loss domain, which commands
choosing more risk aversely—as all options are
losses, the choice between a certain loss and a
gamble offering several potential losses (some
bigger and some smaller than the certain loss)
should make the certain-smaller-loss more attrac-
tive (it minimizes the maximum potential harm).
In the gain domain, in contrast, the choice is
between a certain gain and a gamble offering
several gains (some bigger and others smaller), so
there is no potential harm when choosing the
gamble; therefore, under conditions of uncertainty
about others’ needs and wants, one should focus
on attaining the maximum possible payoff and be
more risk seeking. Therefore, when deciding for
others, the valence effect should be larger when
deciders are more uncertain; this is exactly what
we observed.
Alternative Explanations
Hsee and Weber (1997) outlined two hypothe-
ses concerning preferences for self and other,
which predict uniquely different behavioral choic-
es: default preference and preference-as-feeling.7
The default preference hypothesis, analogous to
the false consensus in social psychology (Marks &
Miller, 1987), assumes that people use their own
preference to predict that of others and, as such,
assume others have the same preference as them-
selves. This hypothesis predicts similar choices
for self and other, which was not observed in our
data.
The preference-as-feeling hypothesis is based
on a dual-process model assumption that one’s
preference is an expression of one’s feelings to-
ward each choice option. Dual-process models
propose that reflective or experiential systems dif-
ferentially dominate choices for self and others.
Specifically, when people make choices that go
against their goals, such choices often are based
on affective evaluations, an account known as the
risk-as-feeling hypothesis (Hsee & Weber, 1997;
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Stone
et al., 2002). This model suggests experiential
processes, rewards and punishments, weigh more
heavily in decisions for self than for others (Beis-
swanger et al., 2003; Nicolle, Symmonds, &
Dolan, 2011; Rolls, 2005). In decisions about
time, contrary to our results, this model predicts
more impatient (discounted) choices for self, due
to feelings driving the person to choose more
immediate payoffs for self (McClure et al., 2004)
and difficulty imagining the other person having
as strong feelings (Fernandez-Duque & Wifall,
2007; Hsee & Weber, 1997). In decisions about
risk, the preference-as-feeling hypothesis predicts
more risk-averse choices for self, for both gains
and losses, because people would decide for oth-
ers partly on their own emotions. This often favors
risk avoidance (Loewenstein et al., 2001), but due
to difficulty considering others as having feelings
as strong as one’s own, this preference should
regress toward risk neutrality. This prediction
does not explain the observed bigger gain–loss
asymmetry in risk preferences when deciding for
others. In summary, we do not find support for the
preference-as-feeling model in intertemporal and
6 This asymmetry in preferences depending on the gain/
loss domain is also known and the “valence effect,” which
is not, however, equivalent to the “framing effect” in the
behavioral economics literature. The framing effects exist
when the same information is provided in both conditions,
just framed differently, which usually leads to “loss aver-
sion”—more risk seeking in the loss frame (see De Martino,
Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). In our task, the loss
situation and the gain situation are different. Thus, contrary
to the framing effect, being risk averse in one situation and
risk seeking in another is not inherently “irrational” in our
task.
7 Hsee and Weber (1997) only examined whether people
can accurately predict the risk preferences of others (i.e.,
they did not study time preferences and did not ask the
participants to actually make decisions on behalf of others).
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risky decisions for self and others in reciprocal
setting.
Conclusions
In the context of decisions for others involving
risk and time, our experiments reveal how reci-
procity may prompt precautionary preference,
which is moderated by social uncertainty. This
phenomenon might be more likely to occur when
agents, as in our design, do not have information
about the others’ particular goals. This is an im-
portant topic, because many important relation-
ships involve decisions for each other, such as
team situations in which strangers are brought
together to form a team with others to perform a
task. Such reciprocal decision-making is also
found in large organizations where deciders do not
personally know the individuals affected by their
decisions, but they realize those individuals are
also making decisions affecting them. In such
situations, the precautionary preferences may be
amplified because the beneficiaries are often de-
tached and abstract agents or groups, which brings
uncertainty about their preferences and goals. Re-
ciprocal decisions are also found in close relation-
ships such as couples and friendships. In contrast,
traditionally, research on surrogate decision-
making has focused on one-sided (e.g., economic
or medical) decisions taken not by the person who
will ultimately gain or lose from the outcome, but
instead by someone else (such as policy makers,
managers, doctors, carers, next-of-kin, and even
strangers in a lab).
Our modeling also revealed that choices are
more random when deciding for others for both
risk and time. This reveals increased uncertainty
in decision-making for others, which is reflected
in choice noisiness, or more formally the reli-
ability with which decision values are translated
into choices (De Martino et al., 2013). How-
ever, an alternative interpretation of the finding,
that choices are more random when deciding for
others, is in terms of differences in motiva-
tion—because people are more deliberate with
their own money and less motivated to decide
for others. There are two objections against this
interpretation of the data. First objection is that
the evidence is against such motivational ac-
counts of self–other differences (Kray, 2000).
Second objection is that such interpretation
does not predict the specific patterns observed
in our data. Choosing randomly and caring less
about others in the risk task implies that deci-
sions and risk preference parameters should av-
erage around risk neutrality for both gains and
losses, that is, the valence effect should be
smaller for others, which is the opposite of what
we found. In the discounting study, more ran-
dom preferences and decisions predicts more
discounting for others, in line with what we
found, but random decision-making implies that
both the average proportion of delayed choice
and the discounting parameter () for others
should be around 0.50, not 0.11, as we observed
(i.e., the random-choice hypothesis predicts
much more extreme levels of discounting than
observed in our data).
To corroborate our findings, future research
should study the neural mechanisms involved in
reciprocal decisions for others, especially when
the beneficiary’s preferences for time and risk
are not explicitly stated as in our task. Further
research should also systematically investigate
how concerns about reciprocity influence pre-
cautionary preferences (e.g., a condition in
which decisions are made for other vs. a condi-
tion in which decisions are made for other who
also makes decision for self), including also
independent measures of individual’s reciproc-
ity and confidence (that the choice is the one
that the beneficiary would pick). Another poten-
tial research direction would be to build com-
putational models of decision-making, which
model the uncertainty in terms of belief distri-
butions about the future for self and other and,
thus, tease apart the interaction between uncer-
tainty and precautionary preferences.
In summary, our two experiments reveal
unique biases in both the preferences and in the
decision rules used to make a choice that satis-
fies one’s own preferences compared with mak-
ing choices on behalf of someone else, which is
in line with the multistage general theoretical
framework employed to understand decision
making (DellaVigna, 2009). Those results also
demonstrate how computational models can re-
veal the underlying processes in decision-
making. In politics and business, being aware of
those decision processes and the self–others
discrepancy in choice, may help policy makers
and managers introduce policies that better re-
flect people’s willingness to trade off risk, time,
and benefits.
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Appendix A
Experimental Instruction for Experiment 1: Intertemporal Choice for Self and Others
Welcome to the experiment! Take time to
read these instructions carefully. If you do have
any questions, please raise your hand and one of
the coordinators will come to you and answer it
privately. Please do not talk to anyone during
the experiment.
In the paragraphs below, we will describe the
experiment. First, as this experiment differs
from most others in the lab, we need to provide
some explanation about how the payments will
work. In this experiment, in contrast to others
run in the lab:
(1) You will NOT be paid in cash. We
will be paying using electronic pay-
ments. Either we can credit the money
into a PayPal account or directly into
your U.K. bank account; you will
need to provide details of one of these
accounts.
(2) Payments will not necessarily be
made on the day of the experiment
(this depends on choices made during
the experiment). Some payments may
be made later on (but even those paid
on the day of the experiment will be
paid electronically).
(3) There will not be a show-up fee. The
show-up fee element will be replaced
by higher payments possible from de-
cisions made during the experiment.
Payments will be on average higher
than most experiments of similar
duration.
If you have any queries about this, please raise
your hand and the experimenter will come and
answer it privately.
Now, about the experiment!
In this experiment, you will make 240
choices about different amounts of money to be
paid. Specifically, each choice will have the
following format:
“Choose £X1 in Y1 weeks OR £X2 in Y2
weeks” where 	1, 	2, Y1, and Y2 are num-
bers. If Y1 or Y2 are equal to zero, that means
“today.” You will make your choice by clicking
on one of the two buttons on the screen.
Not all 240 choices are made on behalf of
yourself, nor will you be paid for every choice.
In fact, one third of the choices relate to pay-
ments to you, one third to another subject in the
laboratory that is male and to another subject in
the laboratory that is female.
The choices where you are deciding for your-
self will have a screen with a black surround,
the choices where you are deciding for another
subject (male) in the laboratory will have a light
blue surround, and the choices where you are
choosing on behalf of another subject (female)
in the laboratory will have a pink surround. The
240 choices will be in six blocks of 40 choices
where each of the 40 choices has the same
beneficiary.
(Appendices continue)
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After you have made your 240 choices, the
computer will choose ONE choice at random to
be paid. If the payment choice is a decision
where you chose on behalf of someone else,
then they will get the payment you chose, AND
you will get the payment they chose (although
not necessarily for the same decision problem).
At the end of the experiment, there will be a
short survey and then we will arrange the pay-
ment information and provide receipts.
All data from this experiment and question-
naire are held anonymously. That is, there is no
unique link that could identify you with the
data.
Appendix B
Experimental Instruction for Experiment 2: Risky Choice for Self and Others
Thank you for taking part in the experiment
today. How much you earn depends on the
choices made in the task, as well as an element
of chance.
During this experiment, half the decisions
you make will be on behalf of someone else and
half on behalf of yourself. The person you de-
cide on behalf of today (your partner) will also
be deciding on your behalf. In the experiment,
each participant will receive a starting amount
of £12, will then gain or lose money from the
decisions made on their behalf by their partner,
and will also gain or lose money from their
decisions made on their own behalf. The whole
experiment takes about 25 min, of which the
first half is for one beneficiary (your partner or
yourself) and the second half for the other ben-
eficiary. You will also receive £5 for attending
(the show-up fee).
What Happens in Each Trial?
The structure of each trial is the same, who-
ever the beneficiary (your partner or yourself).
In each trial, you have to make a choice be-
tween a gamble option and a sure option. Some-
times the decisions will be about gaining money
(the gain trials) and sometimes about losing
money (the loss trials). If you choose the sure
option the beneficiary will get the outcome
shown for certain, which is always gaining £3
for certain in the “gain trials” and losing £3 for
certain in the “loss trials.” If you pick the gam-
ble option, the beneficiary will get one of the
outcomes shown on the pie chart, with the
chance of getting that outcome shown by
the size of that segment.
In contrast to most other experiments you
may have encountered at ELSE, you do not
have a long time to think about your decision.
What happens on each trial is as follows:
(1) The trial decision will appear on the
screen (see example screenshots be-
low).
(2) After about 4 s to think about your
choice, decision buttons will appear on
the screen (two buttons marked
“GAMBLE” and “SURE”).
(3) You have about 2 s to click one of the
buttons to register your choice, after
which the experiment will move onto
the next trial. It is always better to make
a choice within the 2 s, as if you don’t
make a choice in the “gain trials” the
beneficiary will get zero and in the “loss
trials” the beneficiary will lose £6.
You will not receive any feedback during the
experiment. Instead, at the end, one of the gain
trials and one of the loss trials that you decided
about on behalf of your partner and also one
gain trial and one loss trial that you decided
about for yourself will be selected at random
and played out for real.
So, at the end of the experiment, you will see
four trials that you made decisions in, and they
will be played out. Your earnings and partner’s
earnings for you will be added to the £12. After
that, there will be a summary of the results.
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